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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Baxter International, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories*
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent decision out of the Seventh Circuit, the court-in an opinion
authored by Judge Frank Easterbrook writing for the two-judge majority-
ruled that under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards,1 an arbitration panel's determination of antitrust
issues under the Sherman Act could not be reargued in federal court on the
grounds of mistake of law. 2
II. BACKGROUND TO THE BAXTER DECISION
Well before the case under discussion here, the United States Supreme
Court had already decided Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, in which the Court held that antitrust claims arising out of an
international contract could be subject to determination under an arbitration
agreement entered into by the parties. 3 Therefore, it was settled that antitrust
* Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 315 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 2002).
1 The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards [hereinafter Convention] was convened in 1958 to draft an international
treaty that would resolve the difficulties found in the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration
Clauses and the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The
United States became a signatory to the Convention in 1970. The purpose of the
Convention is to promote the acceptance and enforcement of international arbitration
clauses and awards and provide uniform standards for judicial communities in dealing
with foreign arbitration agreements. For a good discussion of the background and
purposes of the Convention, see Jill A. Pietrowski, Enforcing International Commercial
Arbitration Agreements: Post- Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.,
36 AM. U. L. REV. 57, 63-64 & nn. 33-36 (1986).
2 Baxter, 315 F.3d at 831.
3 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 639 (1985)
(holding that statutory antitrust claims arising from international contracts could be
arbitrated consistent with the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act). This decision
represented a turning point from previous case law universally holding that antitrust
claims could not be arbitrated. See DAVID W. RIVKIN, COMPETITION AND ARBITRATION
LAW, THE U.S. SITUATION 129-30 (1993) (citing American Safety Equipment Corp. v.
J.P. Morgan & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826 (2nd Cir. 1968) (holding that the public interest
ramifications of the antitrust laws prevented antitrust claims from being resolved
anywhere but in the courts) and Gemco Latinoamerica, Inc. v. Seiko Time Corp., 671 F.
Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that if a party wished to resolve a dispute under an
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claims could be arbitrated,4 but the scope of review of an arbitration award in
which antitrust issues had been resolved by an arbitral tribunal remained
somewhat ambiguous after Mitsubishi.5 As a result of Baxter, the scope of
review in the Seventh Circuit is now limited to whether or not the arbitral
tribunal noticed that antitrust claims existed and whether the panel gave the
claims a definitive resolution.6 Under the majority's opinion, whether the
arbitrators resolved the antitrust claims correctly under the relevant antitrust
statute is irrelevant.7
Im. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Baxter International, Inc. developed an anesthetic gas called Sevoflurane
in the 1960s.8 Because the compound was difficult and expensive to produce,
Baxter did not attempt to market it at that time but instead continued to
search for an efficient process for producing Sevoflurane. 9 Baxter succeeded
in developing an efficient manufacturing process for Sevoflurane in the
1980s and promptly obtained two process patents encompassing the new
process. 10 Lacking the resources to pay for expensive tests required for Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of Sevoflurane, Baxter granted to
Maruishi Pharmaceutical Company, a Japanese company, an exclusive
arbitration agreement, the party could assert its non-antitrust claims to arbitration but
would have to bring the antitrust claims separately in federal court)).
4 This was not always the case. Half a century ago, the Court believed that rights
under federal laws designed to protect the public could not be determined pursuant to
arbitration because these claims were only appropriate to a judicial forum. The U.S.
Supreme Court held that claims under the Securities Act of 1933 could not be determined
pursuant to arbitration because "the protective provisions of the Securities Act require the
exercise of judicial direction to fairly assure their effectiveness." Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. 427, 437 (1953). The Wilko decision came down at a time when there was
considerable hostility towards arbitration in general on the part of the judiciary. The
hostility toward arbitration of claims under federal law began to erode in the 1970s as the
Court began to issue decisions reversing the trend. See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974) (holding that claims under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 could be submitted to arbitration when the arbitration agreement was part of an
international commercial transaction).
5 See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638 (stating that "[w]hile the efficacy of the arbitral
process requires that substantive review at the award-enforcement stage remain minimal,
it would not require intrusive inquiry to ascertain that the tribunal took cognizance of the
antitrust claims and actually decided them").
6 Baxter, 315 F.3d at 831-32.
7 1d. at 831.
8 Id. at 830.
9 Id.
10 Id. One patent has already expired and the other expires in December of 2005.
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worldwide license to use the Sevoflurane manufacturing process Baxter had
developed.1 1 Maruishi obtained approval from the Japanese government to
market Sevoflurane in that country, where it became a huge success. 12
In 1992, Maruishi entered into a sublicensing agreement with Abbott
Laboratories to shepherd Sevoflurane through the FDA approval process in
the United States and begin marketing the anesthetic gas in this country.13
Under the agreement with Baxter, Maruishi remains the only manufacturer of
Sevoflurane using the Baxter process patents.1 4 Abbott resells Sevoflurane
that it has purchased from Maruishi under the sublicensing agreement, and
Maruishi pays Baxter a royalty based on its total sales. 15 At the time that
Maruishi sublicensed with Abbott, Baxter-Maruishi and Abbott entered into
a Dispute Resolution Agreement containing an arbitration clause. 16 Any
party who felt that another signatory to the agreement had caused impairment
to the "Original Commercial Relationship" could invoke the Dispute
Resolution mechanisms. 17
Today, Sevoflurane is the most popular gas anesthetic on the market in
the United States, holding a 58% market share. 18 As Baxter's process patents
covered only one way of manufacturing Sevoflurane, the drug's popularity
gave other companies an incentive to develop another process for
manufacturing Sevoflurane so that an alternative, generic form of
Sevoflurane could be put on the market to compete with Abbott in the United
States. 19 In 1997, a company named Ohmeda began developing a new
process, which it ultimately patented in 1999. Ohmeda planned to begin
marketing a rival version of Sevoflurane, pending expedited approval by the
FDA.20
Before Ohmeda could bring generic Sevoflurane to market, however,
Baxter acquired the company in a merger. Abbott Laboratories, distressed by
the prospect of competition in the U.S. market, decided to dispute Baxter's
ability to market the new Sevoflurane by initiating arbitration under the
11 Id.
12 Baxter, 315 F.3d at 830.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Abbott Lab. v. Baxter Int'l. Inc., No. 01 C 4809 Consolidated 01 C 4839, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5475, at *3 (N.D. Ill. March 27, 2002).
17 Id.
18 Baxter, 315 F.3d at 830.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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Dispute Resolution Agreement on the grounds that Baxter was causing
impairment to the "Original Commercial Relationship" by violating the
exclusivity term of its license with Maruishi. 21
The dispute was submitted to binding arbitration before a panel of three
arbitrators, consisting of a U.S. attorney, a Spanish attorney, and a Japanese
law professor. 22 In response to Abbott's allegations, Baxter contended that if
the license between Maruishi and Baxter prevented Baxter from competing
in the market, then it violated Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act by
creating an illegal market allocation agreement.23 The arbitral panel ruled
against Baxter finding that the reduction in competition was due to Baxter's
own actions in purchasing Ohmeda. 24 Because Ohmeda had never been a
party to the Baxter-Maruishi agreement, Ohmeda would not have been
precluded from marketing its new Sevoflurane if Baxter had not acquired the
company. 25 In other words, the only restraint on competition in the
Sevoflurane market applied to Baxter and no other independent
manufacturer.
Displeased with the outcome of the arbitration, Baxter filed a motion to
vacate the arbitration award in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois. 26 Abbott in turn filed a motion to confirm the award. 27
The district court granted Abbott's motion to confirm the arbitration award
finding that under the New York Convention of the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Convention), the arbitral panel's
award was not contrary to U.S. public policy and could not be set aside on
those grounds. 28 Namely, the Baxter-Maruishi agreement did not violate the
21 Abbott Lab., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *14-15. According to the district court,
"Baxter's sales of a generic sevoflurane would constitute an impairment of the Original
Commercial Relationship. As defined by clause (a) (iii), generic sales [would] 'reduce the
amount a party would but for such change otherwise receive under any Sevoflurane
agreement,' constituting an impairment." Id.
22 Id. at *12.
23 Id. at * 12, * 18. Under the Sherman Act, an illegal market allocation agreement is
a "horizontal allocation[] of territories or customers among actual or potential
competitors." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
24 Baxter, 315 F.3d at 831.
25 Id.
26 Abbott Lab., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5475, at * 1.
27 Id.
28 Id. The United Nations Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards provides for only limited grounds for vacating an arbitration
award, one of which is that "[tihe recognition or enforcement of the award would be
contrary to the public policy of the country in which the award is sought to be enforced."
See RusSEL J. WEINTRAUB, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 71 (3d ed.
2001).
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Sherman Act or any other U.S. antitrust policies. 29 Baxter then appealed to
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the District Court's
decision. 30 Judges Frank H. Easterbrook and John L. Coffey comprised the
majority, while Judge Richard A. Cudahy dissented. 31
IV. THE COURT'S HOLDING AND RATIONALE
The district court went to great lengths to discuss the merits of Baxter's
antitrust violation argument in its opinion, finally concluding that the Baxter-
Maruishi contract posed no antitrust problems. The appeals court, however,
did not even begin to address the substance of Baxter's antitrust claims.
According to the majority, a potential error in applying a statute is not reason
enough to set aside an arbitral award under the Convention. As Judge
Easterbrook writes:
Baxter argues at length in this court that the Baxter-Maruishi license,
construed [by the arbitral tribunal] to keep the Ohmeda-process sevoflurane
off the U.S. market until 2006, is a territorial allocation unlawful per se
under § 1 of the Sherman Act. But the initial question is whether Baxter is
entitled to reargue an issue that was resolved by the arbitral tribunal. We
think not; a mistake of law is not a ground on which to set aside an award. 32
The court states that an arbitration award that disposes of antitrust issues
should not be easily challenged under the Convention because "to throw the
result in the waste basket and litigate the antitrust issues anew. . . .would
just be another way of saying that antitrust matters are not arbitrable." 33
According to the court, such a result would be contrary to the Supreme
Court's holding in Mitsubishi.34
Baxter argues, however, that it is not attempting to reargue the antitrust
issues. Rather, Baxter claims that the arbitral panel created the antitrust
problems by construing the Baxter-Maruishi agreement in a way as to grant
strong exclusivity to Maruishi-and Abbott by extension.35 According to
Baxter, if the arbitrators had interpreted the agreement differently, there
never would have been any antitrust issues over which to litigate. The
29 Abbott Lab., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5475, at *30, 36-38.
30 Baxter, 315 F.3d at 833.
31 Id. at 829.
32 Id. at 831.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
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Seventh Circuit court disregards Baxter's argument by stating that under the
Mitsubishi standard, all the arbitrators had to do was recognize the antitrust
claims and decide them, which they did.36 As Judge Easterbrook writes,
"[t]he arbitral tribunal in this case 'took cognizance of the antitrust claims
and actually decided them.' Ensuring this is as far as our review legitimately
goes." 37
The final point of the majority's opinion addresses what recourse the
public might have if, in fact, the Baxter-Maruishi agreement does create a
monopoly. According to the court, "[i]f the three-corner arrangement among
Baxter, Maruishi, and Abbott really does offend the Sherman Act, then the
United States, the FTC, or any purchaser of sevoflurane is free to sue and
obtain relief."'38 The court then said that an appropriate remedy might be
divestiture of the Ohmeda process patent. 39
V. THE IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
The Baxter decision represents the next in a line of decisions in which
the general climate favoring arbitration has been extended just a little bit
further. It remains to be seen whether other circuit courts will follow the
Seventh Circuit's holding in Baxter. Also at issue is whether the holding will
be extended to cover arbitration of antitrust claims in purely domestic
arbitration agreements. U.S. Supreme Court decisions after Mitsubishi, in
which the Court decided domestic disputes involving federal securities laws
and RICO claims are arbitrable, indicate that the Baxter holding would
almost certainly be extended similarly. 40
The impact of this decision lies in the extreme amount of deference given
to an arbitration award that interprets a federal statute, even when the award
might be based on an incorrect interpretation of that statute and thus
36 Baxter, 315 F.3d at 832.
37 Id.
38 Id. The dissent was not impressed with the majority's proposed remedy. As Judge
Cudahy explains, the majority's other potential "sources of law enforcement... are all
hypothetical. I know of no authority for the theory that the existence of hypothetical
sources of antitrust enforcement or of competition can be a defense to an agreement
violative of the antitrust laws or to an arbitration award imposing such an agreement."
Baxter, 315 F.3d at 838-39 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
39 Baxter, 315 F.3d at 833.
40 See Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 239 (1987)
(holding that the reasoning in the Mitsubishi decision was applicable to the arbitration of
securities law and RICO claims in a purely domestic dispute); Rodriguez De Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (expressly overruling Wilko
and holding that claims under the Securities Act of 1933 in a domestic context were
arbitrable.); RIvKIN, supra note 3, at 132-34.
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permitting illegal conduct on the part of the parties to the agreement. As
Judge Cudahy explains in his dissenting opinion, "under the majority's
analysis, the rule that unlawful conduct cannot be commanded by arbitrators
is consumed by the exception that, if arbitrators themselves say that what
they have commanded is not unlawful, then 'their answer is conclusive.' 41
This decision goes beyond saying, as Mitsubishi did, that antitrust claims are
arbitrable; it goes on to say that the arbitration panel's answer is the final
answer and for all practical purposes indisputable and absolute. 42
VI. CONCLUSION
With statutory claims in which public protection is the primary aim of
the law, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Baxter is arguably dangerous. In
the system of traditional litigation, there is always the safeguard of appeals to
ensure that the trial court got the answer right the first time around. In an
arbitration in which the panel's answer is accepted as final and binding, there
is little recourse for a party who gets stuck with a wrong answer. 43 This
might not be such a terrible result if the wrong answer affected only the
parties to the agreement. However, when the effects spill over into areas of
public concern such as antitrust, it is not just the parties who will suffer the
price of a wrong answer. 44 Indeed, some scholars of antitrust law argue that
41 Baxter, 315 F.3d at 836.
42 Id.
43 Id. (Cudahy, J., dissenting). According to Judge Cudahy:
While Mitsubishi and its progeny make clear that the choice of arbitral forum is
to be respected, they do not confer on the arbitrators a prerogative to preemptively
review their own decisions and receive deference on that review in subsequent
judicial evaluations. The majority is way off-base when it says that Baxter seeks
merely to have us disregard the panel's decision and "throw the result in the waste
basket." Instead, we are performing exactly the traditional function of judicial
review properly assigned only to us.
Id. (emphasis added).
44 Id. at 838. Judge Cudahy writes:
It is, of course, not the interests of the parties themselves that are primarily at
stake in the outcome of this arbitration. Instead, the interest of the consuming public
is at stake. That public faces higher prices and a constrained supply of sevoflurane as
a result of Abbott's monopoly, conferred by the arbitrators. When public rights are
at stake, there is good reason to be more reluctant to defer totally to the arbitrators,
since they are acting as delegates of the private parties, not of the consuming public.
Too deferential an attitude by the courts when the rights of the consuming public are
at stake can severely undermine the foundations of our economy. For there can be
little doubt that granting Abbott a monopoly to produce sevoflurane in the United
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"[t]he only legitimate goal of American antitrust law is the maximization of
consumer welfare." 45
Brenda M. Williamson
States will raise prices and restrict supply. And applying the analysis of the majority
to arbitration awards yet to come will open a royal detour around the antitrust laws.
Id.
45 F.M. Scherer, Efficiency, Fairness, and the Early Contributions of Economists to
the Antitrust Debates, in COMPETITION POLICY: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 15
(2000) (quoting ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF (1978)).
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